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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIlY AND JAPAN
The Japanese economy is one of the strongest and healthiest in the
world. It is characterized by sound gro-wth,a relatively low rate
of inflation, and little unemployment. There seems to be no .strain
which is probably as much due to the specific attitude of the
Japanese, and in particular to their productivity, as to their social
system. The Japanese worker lives in close symbiosis with his
company and employer - employee relations seem to be less of a
problem than in Europe. Strikes are rare and salaries have progressed
regularly.
Japan is an essential element on the international scene. Thanks
to its discipline and to its work rather than to an "economic miracle"
it has attained the level of the world's great industrial powers. .
Japan, the European Community and the United States exert a particular
influence on the good functioning and development for
economic cooperation in the world, not because they have a special
status or a different legal position from that of th~ir~Qther
partners in the international community, but simply because of the
weight and size of their economies. When speaking of a "Community/
United States/Japan triangle" it is not a privileged situation which
is referred to, but rather the contrary: more responsibilities and
therefore more duties. The other countries have everything to gain
from an effective cooperation between the three economic giants,
whether in general terms (better chances for monetary stability in .
the world, efficient combating of inflation, etc.) or in specific
fields: .for example, the United States, Japan and the Community
were among. the principal protagonists of the commerci~l negotiations
known as the "Tokyo round", but it was the participating countries
who benefited from these negotiations in view of the·GATI principle
according to which the tariff concessions and other negotiations
between two countries are automatically extended to all the others.
It is in this spirit that the efforts of the Community and of
Japan to improve their relations, must be understood.
Although Community-United Staes relations rest at present on well-
established bases, the third side of the triangle , namely the
Community-Japan relations,has only recently experienced a parallel
development: previously, trade relations were generally limited,
monetary cooperation vague, industrial cooperation oftenri6rexistent,
the dialogue concerning the developemnt of the Third World very
irregular.
The first attempt to correct this anomaly in international relations
goes back to 1972. At that time, at the Paris Summit Meeting, the
Nine decided to reinforce the dialogue between the enlarged Community
and the other industrialized countries. In 1973, the Commission-
inaugurated regular bi-annual consultations at a high level with the
Japanese government. These consultations were similar to tho~which
take place with the United States government. They concern both
bilateral problems and important multilateraleconomic problems. (The
Community-Japan negotiations in view of concluding a trade agreement,
which had begun in 1970, broke down over the institution of a-2-
Conmnmity safeguard clause.
Thanks to a delegation settled in Tokyo in November 1974, the
Conmnmity as an entity has established a pennanent liaison'which
enables it to intensify the dialogue and to tighten the links
with Japan.
BILATERAL RELATIONS: Fromtrade.problems toenlarged.cooperationattempts •
Relations between the Corrnnunity and Japan were, for many years, limited
to corrnnercial exchanges. The Japanese effort to penetrate the European
market was constant and effective. European industrialists did not
always make the same effort to penetrate the Japanese market. There
resulted an increasing imbalance in the trade balance between the two
parties. At the time when the Corrnnon Market was created, Japan did
not constitute a market which could absorb many European products:
in the fifties, product per head in Japan corresponded to less than
a third of that of the Conmnmity. As other countries, Japan has had
to concentrate on exports as a result of its latk of raw materials
and energy reserves. Its trade balance has on several occasions been
in surplus.
Japan's export policy succeeded in the sixties and the seventies
far beyond what the authorities themselves had expected. In 1977, Japan'.s
connnercial surplus had reached 17 billion dollars; in 1978, it reached
25 billion dollars.
Since the beginning of the seventies, theCommunity's trade deficit
with respect to Japan increases regularly. It grew from 6,3 billion
dollars in 1978 to approximately 1 billion dollars in 1979 when
Community exports onLy covered a~proximateLy 47% of the imports Ccf
Append; x 1).
Specific problems which,the Community feels,arise in its exchanges with
Japan are: .
- the concentration of Japanese exports on a limited number of sectors,
which are directly hit by intensive competition: electronic products,
sound and television equipment, automobiles and motorcycles,
- the fact that restrictions or technical or administrative impediments
exist as concerns for example shoes, pharmaceutical and beauty
products, chemical and agrochemical products, sanitary and medical
equipment, etc.
- the abnormally low share of ~anufacturedproducts in the total imports
in Japan as compared to the percentage considered as normal: in 1978,
for example, manufactured products represented 60% of the total
imports in the United States (or approximately 110 billion dollars),
46% of the total imports in the Connnunity (or approximately 105 billion
dollars) and 25% of the total imports in Japan (or approximately 20
billion dollars.)
In view of this situation, the two parties have initiated a dialogue,
which has sometimes proved to be difficult, in order to create a better
balance of conditions. Among the principal phases of this dialogue are:I' '
.)',
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the V1Slt to Tokyo of the P1"esident of the Cormnission, Mr. Roy Jenkins
in autumn 1977; the visit of Vice-President Haferkamp, in charge of
foreign relations, in March 1978 which ended in the adoption of a
"joint declaration" covering all trade questions; the visit to Brussels
of the Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda in July 1978; the declarations
and conclusions of the Council and the European CQloc:11particularly
during 1978. These declarations and conclusions defined the broad
!.!g~§_QL~L~SQl.!.1I110!!J~QJ!Il.!.l!p'!gy_gr~!~gr",centered on the theme-:--...-
Europe will enaeavour to- develop· its exports. Japan was invited to
adopt three courses:
- an economic policy based on expansion of internal consmnption (therefore,
of demand both for national and for imported products) and on a
decrease in the balance of payments surplus;
- the opening of its market by removing all the barriers;
temporary moderation in exports in the sectors which are experiencing
a crisis at international level and which consequently require a
certain degree of cooperation (shipping, iron and steel, certain
electronic products, etc.).
Although achieving these objectives takes time and some of them have
not yet been achieved, on the whole the Japanese authorities have
given a positive answer to Community requests. They have introduced
a certain measure of self-discipline in a few export categories: they
have ensured that the rules of international trade be respected (by
accepting restrictive Community measures in the case where violations
have been observed), and they, have taken a certain number of internal
steps to increasingly to open their market, even if on this last point,
Community authorities feel that the situation is not yet entirely
satisfactory and demand further action. The overall surplus in Japan's
balance of payments has been substantially reduced or has,d}sappeared,
largely due to the rise in the cost of products which Japan must
import at all cost: oil, raw materials, certain agricultural products.
As regards the Community, there has been some stabilization of the
deficit in 1979 but no "trend reversal" as yet. With the decline of
the yen in relation to the European currencies, it is to be feared
that the deficit will increase in 1980.
Although customs duties have been reduced as a result of the Tokyo
round, and certain barriers have been removed, a market as difficult
as the Japanese market is not conquered in a few months: years of
effort are needed. In view of this, the Community has budgeted
an ad hoc allocation to promote knowledge of the Japanese market,
the specialized training of junior executives, and commercial exchanges.
The European Commission has given out study grants for periods of 18
months which include the study of the Japanese language and a 6 month
training period in a Japanese firm: it has chosen a consultant living
in Tokyo, who organizes seminars for exporters in Community countries
(providing them, among others, with sector by sector studies of the
Japanese market), as well as "sales missions" to Japan. Several
sector studies are already available. If, in the past, European products
known in Japan were by and large luxury products (French perfumes, italian,
leathers and skins, British travel articles, etc.) efforts are now
concentrated on mechanical products, food products, anti-pollution
equipment, etc.-4-
The Commission and the Member states are, however, conscious that
the objective aiming at "reinforcing the third side" of the .Cormm.mity-
United States-Japan triangle cannot be achieved by exclusively
concentrating on the commercial aspect: it doubtlessly takes priority,
but it cannot be exclusive. It is striking to compare the numerous
links in all sectors which exist between the European and American
economy, and the almost total absence of joint ventures, participations,
joint subsidiaries, etc. with Japanese industry.
BILATERAL RELATIONS: An economic coo eration to be extended progressivel
to .all sp1eres
The possibilities for !gg~!!!e!_£QQ~~!e!!Qgare already being studied
by the "Nine", upon the initiative of Mr. Davignon. Naturally, in
liberal economies such as those of the Community and of Japan this
cooperation cannot be achieved by government authorities and institutions:
it is a task for the business world. The task of government authorities
is to prepare the conditions in which business firms may act without
useless hindrances and complications. The development of the industrial
cooperation could provide an answer to trade problems by developing
reciprocal investments ( rendering useless certain exchanges of merchandise)
and should naturally include !~shgQ!Qg!£e!_SQQ~~!e!!Qgparticularly in
sectors of advanced technology: Japan can contribute much to Europe
in the electronic and data processing sectors, and Europe can contribute
much to Japan in - for example - the aeronautical and nuclear
technology sectors. It is evident that the cooperation effort should
respect the rules of competition and avoid the constitution of cartels
and of dominant positions.
A reciprocal flow of investment and technology also implies the
Q~~g!!}g_QLf~~S!'.!!_~!!5~!~.Japan has traditionally had a rather
closed banking system and a controlled financial market; in May 1978,
the person in charge of these spheres in the European Commission,
Mr. Tugendhat flew to Tokyo to discuss with the local authorities,
the various aspects of a simplification and an easing of banking
regulations and a broader access to the financial market. This
reform cannot take place in a few weeks nor in a few months; but
measures have already been taken and a new banking law elaborated.
1HE COOPERATION BETWEEN 1HE COMMlJNIlY AND JAPAN WITHIN A WORLD CONTEXT
The Community and Japan would not be meeting their world responsibilities
if they would limit their cooperation to bilateral relations. In
the world of today, where the richest and most powerful countries
have become conscious of the need for international solidarity, the
Community and Japan have a particular role to play.
This role has been exercised in the last few years within the framework
of the Western "§~!!~~ where Japan and the Corrummity along with
other leading world powers take decisions which are to guide the
world's economy.
Situations such as those in Iran and Afghanistan emphasize the
necessity for Japan and the Community to coordinate their attitudes
as well as with those of the other countries.
As concerns '.!!g~!Q_!~~_g~Y~!Q~!~g_SQ~!!!~~, the Community has a long
tradition in this field which harks back to its creation: Yaounde
Agreement, the Lome I and 2 Agreement, and increasingly important food
'f!.
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aid and cooperation programs with the Third World.
Since 1978, the Japanese authorities have made a special effort
both as concerns the vohune of the aid and its "quality", that is
to say,the relationship between the loans (which mmtprogressively
decrease) and the gifts (which must represent an increasing share of
the total aid). Japan and the Cormmmity regularly consult each other
during their semestrial bilateral talks and their meetings at interna-
tional level within the OECD and the Aid and Development Committee).
Another important field of international cooperation is that of
~!!::!::2-QJ.!u2L!!~2-!::and the measures which must provide· for it. The
Community and Japan have been, with the United States, among the
leading protagonists of the trade negotiations known as the Tokyo
round, and (even if the possible objectives have not all been achieved)
they have been the basis for a substantial progressive reduction in
customs duties throughout the world. They have also provided "codes"
which define, among others, the rules for international exchanges in
matters of subsidies, compensation duties, anti-dumping norms,
opening of government markets.
In the ~~~!gy sector, the United States, Japan and the European Corrnnunity'
have adopted a joint strategy, which was discussed in detail at the
Tokyo Surrnnit (June 1979).
~~~!!~~fY~ is the focus of United States-Corrnnunity-Japan multilateral
discussions. The dollar is no longer alone in the international monetary
scene: the creation of the "European Monetary System" (EMS) and the
importance of currE.:ncies such as the yen or the DM, make it necessary
to reinforce the cooperation between the policies of the governments
who cont;r:ol these currencies. Any reform of the international monetary
system implies their cooperation. In addition to these problems
handled by the ad hoc world organizations (such as the International
Monetary Fund), periodical meating;between the leading "Financial
Experts" of the principal monetary powers provide valuable exchanges
of views.
The cooperation between the Corrnnunlty and Japan also applies to other
more technical fields, such as for example:
- !::~Q!!_f!~2-1!. the necessity of avoiding escalation of credit
conditions has led the Community, the United States and Japan to
define certain disciplines in matters of interest rates and credit
duration, to which almost all the Western nations have subsequently
subscribed. The reviewing of these regulations is presently under
way within the framework of the OECD,
CONCLUSION
By patient efforts, and by overcoming obstacles which were not
always easy to overcome, the Community and Japan have laiJ the
foundations of a cooperation which should progressively:
- eliminate in the '80s bilateral disagreements and the present
imbalances (which does not necessarily mean in the system of
free multilateral trade which is that of the free world, the
search for a greater stability in the balance of payments). There
will always remain, which is normal, subjects of contention, but
the structure of the dialogue and the consultation procedures which
have been set up, should make it possible to avoid that they
degenerate and to pro~ressivelvreinforce the cooneration ann-0-
collaboration,
- equalize the Community-UnitedStates- Japan triangle by reinforcing
the "third side",
enable the parties to asstmle, with full lmowledge
o of the facts, lIDder
optimal conditions and with increasing efficiency, their ''world
reponsibilities", to the advantage of the entire international
community. 0
*
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EC - JAPAN TRADE STATISTICS
APPENDIX I'
,,
\,
J
I
Imports El!Ports tlaLance lmP. Imports Exports
BaLance Exp.
from Japan to Japan Exp. from Japan to Japaf1 Imp.
I Mio EUA X Mio EU,A % Mio EUA 7. ~'io g I 7. Mia g X Mio S' 7.
I
1773 3,399 2,306 -1,093 67.8 4,180
I 42 2,835 71 -1,345 67.8
1974 4,376 28 2,769 20 -2,607 63.2 5,219 25 3,306 17 -1,913 63.3
1975 4,826 10 2,227 -20 -2,599 46.1 5,981 15 2,767 -16 -3,213 46.3
i 1')(6 6,: ..99 32 2,722 22 -'3,678 42.5 7,153 20 3,043 \ 10 -4,112 42.5
1'177 7,668 19 3,092 13 -4,576 40.3 8,750 22 3,528 16 -5,222 40.3
, ')'13 8,71.1 1,3 ~, 726 20 -4,906 42.7 1.1.100 ~7 I4, ~46 34 -9,3~4 4?7
1979 9,792 12 4,632 24 -5,160 47.3 13,421 21 ' 6,348 33 -7,073 47,3
1978
Jan 621 21 255 18 -366 41.0 760 33 312 29 -448 41.1
Feb 671 19 280 22 -391 41.7 828 32 346 35 -482 41.8
Mar 695 5 303 14 -392 43.6 860 16 388 31 -472 45.1
Apr 711 10 260 8 -450 36.5 891 23 325 21 -566 36./.
May .772 14 306 13 -467 39.6 943 24 374 22 -569 39.6
Jun 742 7 345 33 -397 46.5 916 17 426 46 -490 46.)
JUL 69:' 13 312 18 -382 44.9 934 32 401 32 -5~3 42.'i
Aug 685 7 290 19 -395 42.3 881 20 373 1 33 -508 42.3
Sept 793 19 326 27 -467 41.1 1,029 36 424 44 -605 41.?
Oct 806 24 340 25 -467 42.1 1,101 46 464 47 -637 42.1
tiov 789 16 348 30 -441 44.1 1,044 32 460 46 -584 41••c
Dec 714 8 358 17 -355 50.2 908 16 456 25 -452 ;o.?
_._.
1979
Jan 716 15 339 32 -377 47.3 972 27 460 47 -512 47. :~
Feb 630 -6 323 15 -307 51.2 852 '3 437 I 26 -419 50.2
Mar 847 21 420 38 -427 49.5 1,145 33 568 46 -577 49.6
Apr 825 16 383 47 -442 46.4 1,103 24 512 57 -591 46./.
May 887 15 417 36 -470 47.0 1,172 24 551 47 -621 47.C
Jun 798 8 423 23 -375 53.0 1,067 16 566 33 -501 53.0
JuL 822 8 424 36 -398 51.6 1,11.0 22 588 46 -552 51.5
Aug 779 ,4 428 47 -351 54.9 1,077 22 592 59 -485 54.9
Sep 759 -4 350 7 -409 46.1 1,061 3 489 15 -572 46.0
Oct 949 18 403 19 -546 42.5 1,293 17 559 18 -744 42.8
Nov 898 h4 377 8 -521 41.9 1,226 17 525 12 -711 42.0
Dec 814 n4 348 -3 -466 42.7 1,116 23 487 5 -639 42.7-8-
APPENDIX II
JAPAN'S MAJOR COMMODITY EXPORTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
% =
1979
Increase or
diminution
relative to
1978
MIO g %
All Commodities
Foodstuff
Fish, shellfish
Textiles
Synthetic Fabrics
Clothing
Chemicals
Fertilizers
Pharmaceuticals
Plastic Materials
Non-Metallic Minerals
China Ware
Metal Products
Iron and Steel Products
Non-ferrous Metals
MetaL Products
Machinery and Equipment
Power Generating Machinery
Office Machinery
Metal Working Machinery
T.V. Receivers
Radio Receivers
Thermionic Values Trausters
Motor Vehides
MotorcycLes
VesseLs
Scientific, OpticaL Equipment
Watches, CLocks
Taperecorders
Bearings
12.685
96
72
318
106
44
605
54
112
121
57
163
435
109
219
9.316
124
485
173
190
566
295
2.162
449
436
1.287
178
700
91
+ 14
+ 2
+ 6
+ 15
+ 31
- 14
+ 26
+ 21
+ 24
+ 17
+ 15
+ 39
+ 48
+ 94
+ 9
+ 11
+ 0
+ 21
+ 91
- 14
- 2
+ 22
+ 20
- 3
- 45
+ 20
+ 11
+ 33
+ 23APPENDIX III
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JAPAN'S MAJOR COMMODITY IMPORTS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
% =
1979
Increase or
diminution
reLative to
1978
MIO g %
All Commodities
Foodstuff
Meat
Fish, SheLLfish
TextiLes
TextiLe Mate~iaLs
TextiLe Products
MetaL Ores, Serap
Raw MateriaLs n.e.s.
Wood
MineraL FueLs
CoaL
Crude OiL
ChemicaLs
MedicaL Products
Machinery, Equipment
Non-ELectric machinery
ELectric Machinery
Transport Equipment
Passenger Cars
Precision Instrument
Toys, MusicaL Instruments
Non-Ferrous MetaLs
7.581
904
191
22
189 .
40
749
40
161
2
118
33
1.525
404
2.269
1.060
378
174
385
294
100
177
+ 25
+ 42
+ 66
+ 42
+ 43
+ 11
+ 45
x 8
+ 43
+ 29
+ 180
+ 4
+ 30
+ 12
+ 4
+ 21
+ 17
- 62
+ 27
+ 25
+ 21
+ 24